

12 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed NIE Outlines

I. General Comments

1. There is a need for an 11-4 type estimate to provide an over-all view of the Soviet military.

2. At least one annex in each estimate should serve to detail the future force as guidance for preparation of the DIPP.

II. 11-8-70

1. There is a lot of history and background in the proposed outline. Some of this such as the Cuban Crisis might be included in annexes. Is it proposed to repeat the section describing the evolution of the force each year.

2. Hardness and Survivability is given short shrift and might be included as an annex. The same is true for mobility.

3. Another possible annex would be one on starts and construction timing in order to provide detailed program developments. These would be comparable to the detail in the technical annexes.

4. Inclusion of an expenditures annex.

5. Y-Class submarine construction might be included in an annex.

6. Add "Pindown" Annex.

III. 11-14 and 11-10

1. General Comment. The ONE proposals for 11-14 point in the right direction and are generally consistent with our current organization and mission. The treatment proposed seems to favor the OSR approach to research and analysis. It may present problems for DIA and will probably bring a swarm of Arlington Hall analysts to the USIB table, thereby increasing the controversy over details.

2. Part I is essentially the paper we planned that Omega would produce--based on NSSM-84.

3. Strategic Peripheral Forces are covered under the heading of "Other Soviet Forces" almost as if they were afterthought. The role of the strategic peripheral forces seems to get lost in the general purpose forces and China border problems.

4. Part IV on Quick Response Forces would duplicate parts of NIE 11-10. This is probably acceptable.

5. The outline does not clearly provide for trends or projections, either in the body or the annexes. Part V may have been intended to serve that purpose but--except for the Sino-Soviet issue--doesn't do so.

6. There is no provision for an expenditures section.

7. With fairly broad interpretation, the annexes could serve to replace the NIPP contribution. We would want the annexes to include TOE as well as OB.

8. The major problem for naval forces is in the distinction between 11-14 and 11-10. For the most part the same forces are involved, however, their operations differ. Operations in the three western fleet areas appear to fall into the 11-14 format. Operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean should be discussed in NIE 11-10.

9. For NIE 11-14 we recommend moving the information in Annex B (naval forces) to the body of the estimate. A revised Annex B should include discussion and Tables for a five year force projection of appropriate naval forces.

IV. 11-3

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1.a. [REDACTED] The proposed outline is generally satisfactory. Although ballistic missile defense may be of more interest than air defense, the present order flows better from the discussion of Soviet strategic defense policy. In addition, the section of ASW concerning defense against SLBMs should be next to the ABM section. This would be awkward to do if ABM were to follow the policy section and precede the air defense section.

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1.b. [REDACTED] In 11-3, the ABM section should follow Section I and precede the SAM section. First, because ABM is of greater current interest than SAMs. Second, because it is easier to discuss the ABM potential of SAMs after discussing the ABM system.


2. Future forces should not be treated in one section as in 11-8-70. The "estimative considerations" are quite different for air defense, ballistic missile defense, and antisatellite defense. This is not true of the more monolithic strategic attack forces. On balance, I favor the way the outline now discusses trends for the future in the separate sections.

3. The question on annexes is vexing. We could easily suggest so many as to become submerged in them, both in making larger contributions and in getting them through USIB. We should omit Annex E: Space Surveillance and Antisatellite Defense because it is not particularly contested and could be handled in the text. Annex F: Civil Defense is probably OK but some mention of the latest or most important aspects of civil defense should appear in the text. The other annexes are pertinent.

4. Annex C: ABM Potential of Soviet SAM Systems appears to me not an intelligence subject. At this stage we will have long imaginative tracts by DIA et al which CIA will have to qualify and nauseam. If we must deal with this possibility, why not call the annex Evidence of ABM Capabilities of Soviet SAM Systems. This would be a rather negative section (properly so!) and would have some claim to connection with intelligence production.

5. There should be an additional annex on alternative force projections and their associated expenditures along with the rationale for them.

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Chief

Soviet and East European Forces Division, OSR